Abstract Poole and Rosenthal's NOMINATE scores have been a boon to the study of Congress, but they are not without limitations. We focus on two limitations that are especially important in historical applications. First, the dimensions uncovered by NOMINATE do not necessarily have a consistent "ideological" meaning over time. Our case study of the 1920s highlights the challenge of interpreting NOMINATE scores in periods when party lines do not map well onto the main contours of ideological debate in political life. Second, commonly used DW-NOMINATE scores make assumptions that are not well suited to dealing with rapid or non-monotonic ideological change. A case study of Southern Democrats in the New Deal era suggests that a more flexible dynamic item response model provides a better fit for this important period. These applications illustrate the feasibility and value of tailoring one's model and data to one's research goals rather than relying on off-the-shelf NOMINATE scores.
Poole and Rosenthal's NOMINATE scores have been a boon to the study of congressional history and of American political development. By placing legislators and roll calls in a common ideological space, NOMINATE has permitted the development of measures of such concepts as partisan homogeneity and polarization that (potentially) "travel" across time, greatly facilitating the analysis and comparison of congressional politics across American history. A wide range of studies has employed NOMINATE-based measures to track these concepts over a long time span and to use the resulting measures as independent variables to test competing theoretical models.
1 It is fair to say that no data source has had a greater impact on the study of legislative politics-both historically and in the contemporary period-than the NOMINATE project.
NOMINATE scores provide a statistical summary of legislators' voting behavior. The scores themselves do not have any inherent meaning independent of the theoretical and substantive framework that we use to interpret them. For Poole and Rosenthal, this theoretical framework derives from a formal model of legislative behavior: NOMINATE scores are estimated based on a model for how members eval-as Americans for Democratic Action scores and American Conservative Union scores.
Given that such interest group scores are far more temporally limited than NOMI-NATE -while also suffering from important methodological weaknesses, such as the problem that interest groups may choose votes that generate "artificial extremism"-the case for preferring NOMINATE scores to these measures is a strong one.
3
Our confidence that NOMINATE scores map well onto today's liberal-conservative continuum does not, however, tell us how to interpret these scores in earlier eras. Nor does it resolve the difficult problem of comparing scores measured at different points in time. This paper draws upon two extended cases studies to explore the uses and limitations of NOMINATE scores for understanding ideological conflict and change in American political development. These applications illustrate the feasibility and value of tailoring one's model and data to one's research goals rather than relying on off-the-shelf NOMINATE scores. faction of Progressive Republicans which outflanked both parties on the "left" during these years. In this paper, we assess how closely NOMINATE scores correspond to the progressive-conservative cleavage in Senate roll call voting. We find that first-dimension scores do distinguish conservative from progressive Republicans, but are much less effective in detecting the important, though less dramatic, differences among Democrats. Our evidence suggests that there was an identifiable progressiveconservative cleavage in voting behavior that is more clearly illuminated through alternative measures rather than NOMINATE scores.
The second case study examines Senate politics during the presidency of Franklin Roosevelt, an era of unusual ideological flux. Our focus is the ideological evolution of Southern Democrats, who began the period as strong supporters of Roosevelt's New Deal but ended it as frequent allies of Republicans in limiting and retrenching liberal advances. We use this application to illustrate the specific limitations of DW-NOMINATE, which constrains ideal points to move linearly through time, for examining rapid or non-monotonic ideological change. Based on estimates from a more flexible dynamic IRT model, we show that Southern senators' turn against New Deal liberalism occurred later and much more rapidly than first-dimension DW-NOMINATE scores imply.
Section 2 of the paper focuses on the 1920s case, while Section 3 discusses the New Deal era. Section 4 explores the implications of our findings not only for thinking about NOMINATE scores' historical applicability, but also for the question of how to conceptualize and measure ideological cleavages across time.
the 1920s
According to NOMINATE, Democrats and Republicans were highly polarized in the 1920s. Although the distance between their medians declined over the course of the decade, the two parties were still much farther apart than they would be from the 1930s through the 1950s. The overlap between Democrats and Republicans on the first NOMINATE dimension is also quite low in the 1920s. One way to see this is through Figure 1 , generated by Poole and Rosenthal, which plots the 10th and 90th percentiles of senators' first-dimension DW-NOMINATE scores in each party over time. Notice that throughout the 1920s, the Republican who is at the 10th percentile of "conservatism" for the party (i.e., with a lower NOMINATE score than 90% of Republicans) is still more conservative than the Democrat at the 10th percentile of "liberalism" for his party (i.e., with a higher NOMINATE score than 90% of Democrats). This suggests a political world in which the parties are clearly separated along a dominant ideological dimension.
But this depiction of an ideologically polarized political world with little overlap across parties seems to conflict with other accounts of American politics in the 1920s.
Frustration with the perceived conservatism of both parties in the first part of the decade led to several reformist movements which put forward a "progressive" program outside the two major parties. This program won greater support from Democrats than from Republicans, but its most die-hard supporters typically were found among Republicans. When political historians and contemporary observers describe the political battles of the 1920s, such groups as the Farm Bloc and the "Progressive Bloc" loom large, setting up battles between conservative, Old Guard Republicans and various "insurgent" forces found in both parties. Thus, Murray writes that the 67th
Congress (1921-23) was characterized by the "undisciplined and unpredictable partisanship of competing intra-party vested-interest groups."
5 These groups included conservative Old Guard Republicans, Southern Democrats who supported "favorable regional legislation but opposed almost everything else," urban members who were surfacing as a definable group, and most importantly, a Farm Bloc seeking to "force the government to help them out of the agricultural depression." 6 Murray traces the severe challenges facing Republican leaders as they sought to control the agenda amid these divisions, arguing that the tax and tariff legislation that emerged was severely compromised. Republicans are marked with triangles; the lighter the marker, the higher the CPPA score.
A few observations leap out from the data. First, for the Senate as a whole, 20. Olssen, "Dissent from Normalcy," 220-5. Cummins had alienated Progressives due to his sponsorship of the Transportation Act of 1920, which was seen as, on balance, pro-railroad.
21. Like NOMINATE, item-response theory is a framework for estimating subjects' latent trait (e.g.,their ideal point) from their dichotomous choices (e.g., roll-call votes). We use IRT to scale the CPPA votes mainly for the sake of convenience. 
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Similarly, Carter Glass of Virginia was widely regarded as a moderate (and later, conservative) Democrat. His CPPA score of 0.45 placed him to the right of the typical
Democrat, yet his NOMINATE score was to the left of the Democratic mean. 26. The Democratic mean is from the 68th Congress, when Underwood competed for the Presidency. His CPPA score of 0.29 was well below the Democratic mean throughout the period.
27. Underwood's average NOMINATE score from the 66th to 68th Congresses was also −0.27, again just a bit to the left of the Democratic mean over the same period.
28. Glass's first-dimension DW-NOMINATE score ranged from −0.40 to −0.34 in the Congresses covered by the CPPA measure.
while having very high scores on the second dimension. The 8 lowest scorers on the CPPA are all Republicans, but they have a wide range of first and second-dimension NOMINATE scores. In short, CPPA scores do not seem to map onto two-dimensional NOMINATE space in any straightforward way.
Substantively, a seemingly "liberal" score on the first-dimension NOMINATE scale in the mid-1920s for a Democrat was consistent either with being a strong sup- 31. Glass favored a surtax on high incomes of no greater than 25%, which was Mellon's position; ibid.; see also Olssen, "Dissent from Normalcy," 252.
Glass also clearly took a more conservative position on taxes than the Progressive Democrat Walsh, who backed higher rates on the wealthy. Interestingly, Walsh's first-dimension NOMINATE score placed him a bit to the right of Underwood and Glass (his score was −0.17 in the 68th Congress), yet his CPPA score of 1.37 clearly identified Walsh as Progressive.
32
One possibility is that Underwood and Glass were both generally loyal Democratic partisans and so score within the mainstream of their party on the first NOMINATE dimension. But their personal conservatism (and that of their most important constituents) led them to vote more conservatively than other Democrats on core economic issues related to wealth redistribution. Although the Underwood and Glass cases are suggestive, a more detailed examination of how well CPPA and NOM-INATE scores reflect contemporary understandings of Democrats' conservatism in the 1920s will be necessary before firm conclusions can be reached.
33
Another way to compare the NOMINATE data to the CPPA measure is to consider the degree of party overlap. Based on the first dimension NOMINATE measure, 32. Though not in the Senate, leading Democrat and future Speaker John Nance Garner also "did not agree with the progressives" on taxation, standing "well to the right of the progressive Democrats"; Olssen, "Dissent from Normalcy," 213. Indeed, Garner had backed Mellon's 1921 tax plan and favored less aggressive changes than the progressives in 1924; ibid., 227-34. Yet Garner's NOMINATE score placed him well to the left of the Democratic median in the House; indeed, his DW-NOMINATE score in the mid-1920s was at the far end of the Democratic spectrum, placing Garner to the left of such well-known liberals as Adolph Sabath, the Chicago Democrat who in the late 1930s and 1940s fought against Garner's conservative Democratic allies on the House Rules Committee.
33. Senate Democrats' ideological divisions were not confined to taxation. 3.3% of senators from the 66th to 68th Congress were closer to the opposing party's median than to their own party's median. All of these senators were Republicans (the rate was 6% for Republicans, and 0% for Democrats). Using the CPPA measure, party overlap is substantially higher: 13% overall, with 9% of Democrats and 16%
of Republicans closer to the opposing party's median.
34
A final observation is that second-dimension NOMINATE scores track CPPA scores less well than do first-dimension scores. Figure 3 presents the relevant scatterplots for the full Senate, for Republicans, and Democrats. For the chamber as a whole, there is no relationship between CPPA scores and second-dimension NOM-INATE scores (r = −0.01). Among Republicans, however, there is a reasonably strong relationship: high second dimension scores tend to correspond to greater progressivism (r = −0.68). The same pattern holds among Democrats, though the relationship is a bit weaker than among Republicans (r = −0.51).
In sum, the comparison of NOMINATE scores and CPPA ideal points suggests some of the strengths and limitations of our workhorse measure of member ideology.
It is striking that the overall correlation between the two sets of scores is so high in an era when the two main parties' ideological reputations were far from clear.
The fact that CPPA scores correlate more closely with first-dimension NOMINATE scores than they do with party indicates that the variation in NOMINATE scores in the 1920s partly reflects genuine variation in senators' progressivism, net of party.
However, first-dimension NOMINATE scores do much better in capturing variation 34. These figures were calculated by comparing each member's score in a given Congress to the party medians in that Congress. For CPPA scores, each member's score was constant across Congresses but the party medians did shift a bit due to member turnover. 
AFL Ideal Points
The AFL was the leading labor organization in the country in the early twentieth In sum, the three alternative measures of member voting behavior-derived from votes identified by the CPPA, AFL, and Farm Bloc-track one another quite well, particularly for Republicans. Even among Democrats, however, it is striking that the three alternative measures seem to pick up on common variation in voting behavior that is less evident when the NOMINATE measure is used to estimate ideal points.
From a substantive standpoint, the meaning of first-dimension scores seems clearcut when one considers Republicans: it taps into a sharp cleavage between progressive 38. While the votes do reflect the position favored by the bloc and its leaders, it is not altogether clear that the bloc itself compiled this list of votes. As such, treating it as a "scorecard" is more problematic than is the case for the CPPA and AFL votes. Still, the votes can be considered a measure of support for the programs advocated by the Farm Bloc. 
Models of Spatial Change Over Time
Comparing ideal points across different institutions or time periods is one of the most difficult and fragile aspects of ideal-point estimation. Doing so requires assumptions that "bridge" the model across contexts. One approach is to assume that actors who move between contexts, such as state legislators moving to Congress, remain spatially constant. 44 A second approach is to bridge using positions taken by actors in different contexts on the same choice, such as Supreme Court cases or congressional bills.
45
For the purposes of measuring ideal-point changes in Congress, the first approach is unsuitable. The second is possible in theory but infeasible in practice due to limited repetition of votes and changes in the policy status quo over time. restrictions on members' spatial movement over time.
DW-NOMINATE, the dynamic form of W-NOMINATE, constrains ideal points to move as a polynomial function of time (e.g., a straight line or a parabola). Since Poole and Rosenthal have found that a simple linear trend provides the best model of change over time, the DW-NOMINATE scores available for public download are based on a linear dynamic model. 47 Under this assumption, ideal points are cardinally comparable across time-that is, it is possible to say that member A moved X distance between congresses. A downside of the linearity assumption is that any spatial movement in a legislator's ideal point is apportioned evenly across their entire congressional career. Thus, while the assumption of a linear trend may be adequate for most purposes, it is not well suited for analyzing rapid or non-monotonic change.
48
An alternative to the linear-change restriction is to bridge the model over time via Bayesian priors about the distribution of ideal-point shifts between congresses.
49
In this approach, shifts between congresses are typically assumed to follow a normal distribution centered at zero-that is, legislators may jump to the left or right, but their expected location in a given congress is their location in the previous congress. A legislator's ideal point in congress t is estimated as a weighted combination of their location in the congress t − 1 and the location implied by their voting record in congress t, where the weight on congress t is determined by the (typically large) variance of the normal distribution.
51 Even though this model allows ideal points to move very flexibly over time, the ideal points are bridged across congresses by the assumption that their expected value in t is their value in t − 1. 
Policy Domains and Dimensionality
In Section 2, we scaled roll-call votes chosen by advocacy organizations to score members of Congress. To the extent that the positions of these organizations derive from a coherent political ideology, ideal-point estimates based on these votes have an ideological interpretation in an ideational as well as a statistical sense. 53 An alternative way to imbue ideal-point estimates with greater substantive interpretability is to restrict the roll-call data to a particular policy (as opposed to ideological) domain.
In this application, our substantive interest is Southern senators' changing support for New Deal liberalism over the course of the Roosevelt administration. Given that first-dimension NOMINATE scores are often interpreted as measures of conservatism, particularly (in this era) economic conservatism, we could use them to 51. In Bayesian terminology, the posterior distribution of the ideal point parameter is proportional to its prior distribution (from congress t − 1) times its likelihood (in congress t).
52. Like DW-NOMINATE, the dynamic IRT model does not account for aggregate spatial movement in Congress as a whole. If no legislators retired between periods and all moved a constant amount to the right, the model would not detect any ideological change among legislators. More subtly, if a large bloc of legislators became more conservative while all others remained constant, the estimated movement of the bloc would be biased toward zero and that of the constant legislators biased away from zero.
53. The assumption that the organizations' positions reflect a broad ideology is most plausible for the CPPA and least applicable to the Farm Bloc.
chart Southerners' ideological evolution. But in addition to the issues raised by the dynamics detailed above, the problem with DW-NOMINATE scores is that they are estimated using all roll calls, including those that have nothing to do with the New Deal. It is thus difficult to interpret them as direct measures of opposition to New Deal liberalism.
A second, subtler issue with using first-dimension DW-NOMINATE is that it represents only one dimension in a two-dimensional space. While two-dimensions may provide a better fit to the roll-call data than one, 54 using only one dimension when two have been estimated distorts the space away from the best-fitting single dimension. Given that the substantive question at hand-degree of support for the New Deal-is almost inherently one-dimensional, this is undesirable for our purposes. Hill.
61
Here, we use the tools of spatial modeling to examine the effects of these political dynamics on roll-call voting in the Senate during the Roosevelt administration (the 73rd to 79th congresses). 62 We gauge senators' support for the New Deal using two congress-specific measures: first-dimension DW-NOMINATE scores and ideal-point As an alternative, they compute re-centered and re-scaled W-NOMINATE scores using the method suggested by Tim Groseclose, Stephen D. Levitt, and James M. Snyder Jr., "Comparing Interest Group Scores across Time and Chambers: Adjusted ADA Scores for the U.S. Congress," American Political Science Review 93, no. 1 (1999): 33-50. The adjusted W-NOMIANTE scores are comparable over time under the assumption that a member's estimated ideal point in a given congress is a function of their long-run average ideal point, "shift" and "stretch" parameters specific to that congress, and an i.i.d. random shock. The shift and stretch adjust for changes in the agenda across periods. (Note, however, that Poole and Rosenthal claim that NOMINATE is quite robust to agenda differences.) See pages 45-9 of Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder's "Comparing Interest Group Scores" for an insightful discussion of the assumptions of this model and its relationship to NOMINATE. The random shock allows ideal points to deviate randomly in each congress, creating an effect similar to the random walk prior in Martin and Quinn's dynamic IRT model. The primary difference between the two models is that the former treats ideal points in each congress as deviations from legislators' average over their entire career, whereas the latter treats them as deviations from their ideal point in the previous congress.
estimates from a one-dimensional dynamic IRT model. The DW-NOMINATE scores were downloaded from Keith Poole's www.voteview.com. The IRT ideal points were estimated in R using the function MCMCdynamicIRT1d. 63 Only roll calls involving social welfare or economic regulation-the core of the New Deal issue complexwere used to estimate the IRT model.
To get a feel for the differences in the two sets of estimates, we first consider the career of Mississippi Democrat Theodore Bilbo, who served in the 74th to 79th
congresses (he died in 1947). Bilbo is now remembered as one of the last fullthroated racial demagogues in the Senate, to an extent that embarrassed even his fellow Southerners. 64 Yet Bilbo's embrace of racial demagoguery occurred relatively late in his political career. Until the early 1940s, Bilbo was best described as a "redneck liberal" who expressed a flamboyant form of economic populism. 
68
The point of the foregoing analysis is not that the IRT estimates are correct and the DW-NOMINATE scores are not. Rather, it is that the estimates generated by an ideal-point method can depend significantly on the assumptions of the model. No method is assumption-free, of course. But the appropriateness of different assumptions varies according to the structure and goals of the analysis. For most purposes and for most of congressional history, DW-NOMINATE's linear change assumption seems to work well. In this era of ideological flux, however, it provides a poor fit to the data and to the historical record, whereas a dynamic IRT model is more plausible.
Implications and Advice
In this final section, we draw out some larger lessons from the case studies we have examined. At the outset, we wish to re-emphasize our appreciation for the NOMI-NATE research program and its contributions to the study of congressional history and development. Our goal is not to criticize NOMINATE but to encourage historically oriented congressional scholars to think more deeply about the interpretation of NOMINATE scores and to consider alternative approaches that may be better suited to their research goals.
68. Though Southern Democrats who entered the Senate in the 78th and 79th congresses were a little more conservative on average than those they replaced, Southerners' rightward turn in these congresses is mostly attributable to the adaptation of continuing members; see Devin Caughey, 70. As Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder, "Comparing Interest Group Scores," 46-7 note, the linearity restriction means that hypotheses positing rapid ideological change-such as final-term shirking or responses to redistricting-cannot be tested using DW-NOMINATE.
A hybrid of these approaches is Nokken-Poole NOMINATE, which involves first estimating roll-call locations with a constant ideal-point model and then estimating congress-specific ideal points conditional on the roll-call estimates.
71
As versatile as NOMINATE scores are, it often is better to use ideal-point estimates tailored to particular research goals. Section 3's case study of the Southern Democrats during the New Deal, for example, highlights the difficulty of using offthe-shelf DW-NOMINATE scores to examine rapid, nonlinear spatial change. As an alternative, it uses scores from a one-dimensional dynamic IRT model estimated it is possible to derive estimates of additional quantities, such as the location of the chamber median, from DW-NOMINATE scores, the uncertainty (i.e., the standard error) of these estimates is not derivable from publicly available data.
76
An alternative to relying on publicly available data is to estimate a dynamic model tailored to a particular application. One option, though hardly the only one,
is the dynamic IRT model we used in Section 3, which lacks the rigidity and other drawbacks of DW-NOMINATE. Nevertheless, the dynamic IRT model is not without its costs. Foremost among these is computation time. 77. Another cost of a dynamic IRT model is the lack of a software program for estimating more than one spatial dimension. Though we are not aware of any existing implementation, a twodimensional dynamic IRT model could in theory be estimated using a Bayesian simulation program such as Stan.
simulations, which can require several weeks or more to complete.
78 For contemporary scholars used to statistical analyses taking seconds rather than weeks, this may feel prohibitively time-consuming, though it is probably a fraction of the total time they will spend on the project.
The case study of progressivism in the 1920s raises a different methodological and conceptual question: how should scholars identify and assess the main ideological cleavage in politics at a particular moment in time? The simplest answer would be to say that the relevant ideological cleavage is whatever emerges from a one-or two-dimensional estimation of ideal points based on all roll calls in Congress. The advantage of this assumption is its simplicity: it allows one to assess behavior across time without relying on potentially subjective coding decisions or expert judgments.
Many consumers of NOMINATE scores implicitly (or at times explicitly) make this move when they treat the scale as providing a consistent measure of ideological polarization, party homogeneity, and so on.
One potential criticism of this approach is that the first dimension identified by NOMINATE may be as much a partisan dimension as it is an identifiable ideological dimension.
79 From this perspective, it is striking that Poole and Rosenthal refer to the first NOMINATE dimension as both a partisan dimension and a liberalconservative dimension. One might resolve the apparent tension between a partisan 78. Estimating the dynamic version of the model is much more computationally intensive than estimating a static version for each congress. The simulations required for the progressivism case study in Section 2 took less than an hour. We would argue against the idea that there is a global answer to this question.
The purpose of one's study is crucial. If one is interested in party-based cleavages, NOMINATE's limitations are of much less concern. But if one is seeking to understand the "liberalism," "progressivism," or "conservatism" of particular members or factions, the fit between NOMINATE and alternative metrics at a given point in time is central.
What would make an alternative metric a valid indicator of ideological position- Our admittedly tentative answer to these challenges is that validating an alternative measure-such as the CPPA-involves showing that practicing politicians themselves recognized the underlying dimension that the scale purports to assess. This recognition need not be universal or comprehensive, but to the extent that political actors themselves see the relevant dimension of conflict similarly to the measure, we can be confident that the scores capture something meaningful rather than being a reification of a dimension that was not operative for individual politicians. Ideology is, in part, a heuristic that people use as they evaluate new proposals and issues. For it to operate as a heuristic, however, the relevant actors have to "see" the relevant dimension.
Our At the same time, efforts to use scaled ideal points across a long time span face difficult challenges. First, the underlying dimensions being estimated cannot be assumed to have a common meaning across time, at least insofar as that meaning is given an ideological interpretation. Second, the appropriate identifying assumptions for estimating ideal points will depend, in part, on both the historical context and the analysts' purposes. The linear change assumption in DW-NOMINATE is appropriate in many contexts and for many purposes, but in times of major ideological or policy upheaval, alternatives that allow for more flexibility in the evolution of members' positions may be preferable.
